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LAw AND ECONOMICS IN ANTITRUST
ANTITRUST, the central area in the field of competition, is prob-
ably unique among the government areas in which economic analy-
sis can be applied. Since our antitrust laws are forms of business regu-
lation, their application is focused on litigation. In contrast, govern-
ment activity rarely provides occasions for litigation in such fields as
stabilization, monetary and fiscal policy, international trade, and eco-
nomic growth.' Even when broad policy issues are considered in anti-
trust, the spotlight remains on litigation. The procedures applied in
the pertinent administrative agencies, such as the Federal Trade Com-
mission, are patterned after the courts. The emphasis is on litigation
and the settlement of controversy, not on affirmative, nonlitigious gov-
ernment administration.
With this focus, it is only natural that lawyers should dominate the
administration of our antitrust policies. Lawyers represent the govern-
* This article is largely based on a paper delivered during the Brookings Lectures
1958-59, and published under the title of Competition and Monopoly, in a volume
entitled ECONOMICS AND THE POLICY MAKER, issued by the Brookings Institution in the
fall of 1959. We are indebted to the Brookings Institution for permission to republish
the paper.
" B.S. 1930, M.A. 1933, J.D. 1933, New York University. Senior Staff of the
Brookings Institution; member of the New York and Illinois bars. Author, BUSINESS
RESERVES FOR POST-WAR. SuRvivAL (1943). Contributor to professional publications.
'Public policy problems that lie outside the fields of government regulation of busi-
ness do not contain significant legal elements. In those other areas, the economist ad-
vises the administrator and the policy-maker, who need not be a lawyer. In fact, there
have been many occasions when economists have served as policy-makers. The applica-
tion of economic analysis to public policy problems in these other areas of government
activity are discussed in other lectures in the 1958-59 Lectures of The Brookings Insti-
tution. See Colm, Economic Stabilization Policy; Jacoby, The Problem of Creeping
Inflation; 'Roosa, Monetary and Credit Policy; and Hagen, Economics and Economic
Development.
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ment and private plaintiffs, lawyers represent the defendants or re-
spondents, judges adjudicate the controversies, and lawyers generally
run the antitrust agencies and the pertinent congressional committees.
Inevitably, lawyers play the central roles in the development and ad-
ministration of our antitrust laws.
Therefore, a basic prerequisite for the adequate application of eco-
nomic analysis in antitrust administration is to develop analytical tools
that are useful for litigation procedures and can be effectively adapted
to the skills of the lawyer.
Effective application of economic analysis in antitrust requires an
appreciation of the differences in legal and economic methodology. The
law provides rules that are based on a recognized structure of statutes
and court decisions. True, there are many uncertainties in the law.
However, they are all capable of resolution, though it may be tempo-
rary, by procedures operated within a clear framework.
Our legal system provides an effective mechanism for determining
the winner and the loser in a controversy. Since the system is founded
upon the technique of adversary proceedings, it requires that all parties
accept the decision of the highest court which may be involved. There-
fore, during the course of litigation, a lawyer is told whether he is right
or wrong.
In contrast, the economist functions within a nebulous operational
framework. Though he frequently must make predictions, there can
be no clear determinations of his success or failure.2 Even if his col-
leagues or superiors-whether in government, business, or the univer-
sities-should agree with him, there is no mechanism for an unequivocal,
overt determination of the correctness of his findings. In the final
reckoning, the test of economic analyses is what takes place in the econ-
omy. However, even that test cannot be conclusive, because of the
effects of forces and circumstances that are not covered by the analysis
or that could not have been visualized at the time the analysis was made.
Another distinction between law and economics relates to the dif-
ferences in the standardization of the technical terms used.3 In most
fields, the law employs relatively well-defined terms that are accepted
by all the participants. Meanings of most words of art are established
through statutes and court decisions and can be proven through prece-
dent. On the other hand, there is no organized procedure for fixing
* HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 73, 74 (948).
* The same terms may have different meanings in law and in economics. See for
example, differences in the concepts of monopoly in law and economics. Mason, Monop-
oly in Law and Economics, 4"7 YALE L.J. 34- (937).
[Vol. x96o: 157
COMPETITION
the meaning of economic terms that will be accepted by all members of
the profession. Since economic problems are harder to resolve, ques-
tions of terminology are especially difficult, and much attention is
given to debates on the meaning of words.
Another set of problems in applying economic analysis in anti-
trust is technical in nature. Litigation, espedally in the antitrust
field, frequently calls for long drawn-out proceedings, with many
technical involvements concerning the nature of the evidence that
will be considered in the course of the case. Additionally, there are
many subtle rules concerning the burden of proof, the weight of
the evidence, and the theory of the case. Therefore, technical legal
procedures, rather than straightforward economic analysis, determine
what evidence will be heard and how it will be applied.
Cutting across these basic differences between the two disciplines
are several factors that influence the relationships between the two pro-
fessions. Lawyers, on the whole, are not accustomed to working with
experts in other disciplines in planning or prosecuting a case. By and
large, it seems fair to say that lawyers and judges prefer the free-
wheeling of their own understanding and of their own interpretations.4
Even though they employ experts from other fields as witnesses, they
are not accustomed to consulting with these experts on equal terms.5
Lawyers also prefer working with concepts and techniques that they
use regularly. For example, lawyers are much more comfortable when
a case involves intent, conspiracy, or good faith than when it turns on
such economic issues as a lessening of competition, or a tendency to create
a monopoly." Given the lawyers' commanding position in this field, it
seems only natural that they are not inclined to handle economic prob-
lems in a case if they have other alternatives. Therefore, whenever
possible, antitrust litigation centers on issues of good faith and con-
spiracy rather than competition.
It would be an exaggeration to say that lawyers never seek help
from the economists or that economic analysis has made no inroads in
'Riesman, Law and Sociology: Recruitment, Training and Colleagueship, 9 STAN.
L. RE V. 643, 651 (-957).
' Grether describes economists as "handmaidens of the lawyers" in the antitrust field.
Grether, Economic Analysis in Antitrust Enforcement, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 55 (1959).
ain his study UNITED STATES V. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY CORPORATION: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF AN ANTI-TRUST CASE 335 (1956), Carl Kaysen said: "Indeed,
it is no exaggeration to say that an overall view of the market and United's position in
it hardly emerged from the Government's presentation of its case at all, so heavily was
it pointed toward 'intent.' United likewise used most of its presentation for material
of the same kind." See DIRLAmn & KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION 45-54 (.954).
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law practice. Antitrust lawyers, whether they stand in front of our
judicial benches or sit behind them, have exhibited a growing awareness
of the economic aspects of antitrust problems.7 However, because of the
lawyers' predilection for issues of intent and good faith, it has not been
easy for them to plunge into unknown, imprecise economic analysis when
they can handle a case on a theory of good faith or conspiracy. Nor is
it easy for them deliberately to forego filing charges of conspiracy in
favor of proceedings that call for complex economic analysis.
On the other hand, economists have overlooked some strategic fac-
tors that influence the application of economic analysis in the antitrust
field. On the whole, they have tended to neglect operative problems.
They have not dearly recognized the need for economic tools that can
be applied by the lawyers within a statutory and judicial framework.
By and large, they have concentrated on methods of analysis that engage
the interest of their fellow economists only.' They have overlooked,
also, the need to develop analytical tools for forward action in order to
help the lawyers to formulate court decrees that will inject competitive
forces in a market.'0 Instead, they have concentrated on interpretations
of past developments, which are useful primarily in finding a violation
of the antitrust laws. Lastly, their frequent failures to distinguish be-
tween issues of policy and issues of administration have limited the
contributions of economic analysis in the broad field of competition.
The writer's thesis is that the tools of economic analysis will not be
ultilized adequately in the field of competition and monopoly until
lawyers and economists learn to co-ordinate their disciplines more effec-
tivelyi that progress in this regard has been inadequate; and that we
have scarcely started to realize the potential usefulness of economic
analysis in either the development or administration of our competitive
policies. In this article, the writer proposes to re-examine this thesis in
the light of some of the operating problems involved in the formulation
" See, Lockhart & Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether
Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65 HARV. L. REv. 913,
979 (1952). The article presents a plea for more economic analysis.
' Some economists feel that intent is the essential feature of an antitrust violation.
See BURNS, A STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS 57 (.958).
0 See Alfred North Whitehead's general criticism of the "anti-rationalism of science."
He feels that the "[science of political economy] fixes attention on a definite group of
abstractions, neglects everything else.... " WHITEHEAD, SCIENCE AND THE MODERN
WORLD 288 (.929).
"0 F. A. Hayek is critical of current economic discussions which center on the dif-
ferences between perfect and imperfect competition. He feels there should be more
attention given to the removal of suppressions of competition. See HAYEK, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 1o.
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Policies affecting competition and monopoly are formulated through
a number of channels. Some policies are developed directly through
legislation-federal, state, and local. Most of them, however, are de-
veloped through judicial opinions, interpretations, and activities of
administrative agencies, congressional investigations, and congressional
pressures.
We have leaned heavily on our courts for the formulation of our
antitrust law. We have adopted a "common law" system for developing
the law, case by case, instead of spelling out detailed codes. The social
theory behind the "common law" development is that the law wil be
hammered out gradually through adversary proceedings over a period
of time.
Dependence upon court-developed law is dearly indicated by the
generality of the language used in the antitrust laws. Thus, the key
phrases in the Sherman Act,'1 the first of these laws, are "restraint of
trade" and "monopolize." The Clayton Act 2 and the Robinson-Patman
Act' 3 rely upon such clauses as "substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly." The Federal Trade Commission Act' 4
strikes at "unfair methods of competition."
In employing such general language, Congress intended that the
specific content of the laws would be established through court or agency
interpretations. The justification for such judicial development is that
the law will be evolved slowly, since the courts, in moving case-by-case,
can consider the effects of previous decisions. This evolutionary method
should permit orderly consideration of the subject through the process
of judging specific controversies which are presented by skilled lawyers
who are dose to the operating problems.
In the evolution of law through litigation, lawyers play central
roles, whether they represent the government or private clients. On
the government side, the selection of cases to prosecute is strategic. If
a government agency decides not to prosecute a given practice, the
courts are not afforded the opportunity to consider the question of law
11 26 Stat. 2o9 (x890), 15 U.S.C. §§ '-7 (195z).
'12 38 Stat. 730 (-9-4), -5 U.s.c. §§ 12-77 (1957).
13 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, - 3 b (1952).
11 38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§41-58 (.952).
Vol. x96o: 1571 COMPETITION
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
which may be involved. On the private side, lawyers for plaintiffs in
antitrust actions play a similar role, while lawyers for defendants play a
vital part through their formulation and exposition of other theories
of the law. The courts cannot determine, on their own, which theories
to test or which cases to try.
Congressional investigations and pressures are of substantial import,
even when they do not lead to new legislation. Administrative agencies
must consider congressional reactions even when no statutory changes
are in prospect. Congressional pressures and legislative inquiries can
exert strong influences on the volume of activity of the agencies, on the
vigor behind it, and on the direction it takes.
Over-all, these administrative, legislative, and judicial developments
are influenced by the climate of public opinion. Through published
analyses of industries and commentaries on judicial and administrative
developments; economists and students of the law play increasingly
important roles.
A. Problem of Defining Objectives
The formulation of competitive policies requires consideration of
much more than our economic goals. Deep political and social aims
also constitute important elements of our antitrust policy. 15
While our most obvious concern is with economic efficiency and
higher standards of living, the social and political implications of con-
centration of power have been major influences in the antitrust policy10
field. In fact, there has been substantial support of a militant antitrust
policy from people who are interested primarily in broad political and
social forces1 7 They believe that an economy which is run entirely by
"'Young, The Sherman Act and the New! Anti-trust Legislation, 23 J. POL. ECON.
214 (i915). Mr. Justice Black said, "The Sherman Act was designed to be a compre-
hensive charter of economic liberty. . . . It rests on the premise that the unrestrained
interaction of competitive forces [will provide] an environment conducive to the
preservation of our democratic, political and social institutions." Northern Pacific R.R.
v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 4 (1957). Rostow, The New Sherman Act: A Positive
Instrument of Progress, 14. U. CHI. L. REv. 567, 569-74 (1947); Gunton, The Eco-
nomic and Social Aspect of Trusts, 3 POL. Sci. Q. 385 (1888).
" DIRLAm & KAHN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 15-17.
" Levi, The Antitrust Laws and Monopoly, 14 U. CHr. L. REv. 1531 155-56 (x947).
Some elements of this striving for political and social results can be found in the history
of development of both English and American attitudes toward monopoly. See Jones,
Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition, 35 YAI. L.J. 9o (19.6),
and 36 YALE LJ. 351 (xz) ; WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM (1x91).
For a statement of this point of view in a discussion of Japanese antitrust law, see
Ashino, Experimenting with Anti-Trust Law in Japan, 3 THE JAPANESE ANNUAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (-959).
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large companies entails a number of antidemocratic consequences. They
fear that the political and social influences of the middle-class in our
society would be lost; that the leadership contributed by independent
members of the liberal professions would be weakened; and that the loss
of these strong influences would damage our democratic institutions. In
general, they are not ready to rely on the good will of industrial giants
and the newly-heralded "business statesmanship" as the major political
forces in our society.' 8 They fear concentration of power in any form.
Another facet of these political and social objectives concerns the
appropriate areas of governmental regulation.' 9 Many feel that a strong
democratic society cannot endure under stringent government regula-
tion.20  This does not imply that they favor a simple, uncomplicated
laissez faire system.21 Rather, they are interested in utilizing the small-
est practicable amount of government regulation. They believe that,
if competitive forces .were destroyed, pressure for government super-
vision of the dominating enterprises would be irresistible and we would
lose our free enterprise system.22- Consequently, they feel that main-
tenance of active competition is vitally necessary if we are to avoid an
economy dominated by government regulation.28
Recognition of these political and social objectives does not imply
that the economic objectives play a minor role. Nor does it require that
economic analysis should be reformulated to encompass all three objec-
tives.24  Rather, an understanding of the three-way .consideration of
antitrust policy makes it even more important that the economists pro-
duce vigorous economic analyses of the policy problems.
It is assumed in many current discussions that there are many in-
compatibilities between economic efficiency and these political and social
objectives.25 This assumption is premised on the belief that large com-
18 Some do not want to rely on "business statesmanship" for economic reasons. -See
Lewis, Economics by 4dmonition, 49 Am. ECON. REV. 384. (z959).
" For an interesting discussion of these interrelations, see HoovER, THE ECONOMY,
LIBERTY, AND THE STATE eSp. ch. 13 (1959).
20 HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (-944-).
2' M. Rotondi feels that "it would be better to speak -of equality in competition rather
than freedom of competition." Rotondi, Unfair Competition in Europe, 7 AM. J. CoMP.
L. 327, 329 (1958).
" Simons, Some Reflections on Syndicalism, 5z J. POL. ECON. 1, 5 (944) 5 STOCK-
ING & WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE ENTERPRISE 548 (1951).
28 Rostow, supra note iS, at 573-
"Viner, International Trade Theory and Its-Present Day Relevance, ECONOMICS
AND PUBLIC POLICY 122 (1955).
2" See BERLE, THE TWENTIETH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (x954) 5 BURN-
HAM, THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION (1941) 5 LILIENTHAL, BIG BUSINESS: A NEw
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panies in concentrated industries produce goods and services with greater
efficiency and lower costs than smaller,2" competitive enterprises and
that they will generate more substantial innovations in products and
services. Support of this premise does not always imply a willingness
to discard the political and the social objectives in order to improve
economic efficiency. However, it does imply that we need to weigh the
relative importance of the various objectives for a dearer formulation
of national policy.
Accordingly, one of the main challenges for economic analysis today
is to provide for a clear, definitive picture of the influences of the com-
petitive framework on efficiency, 28 innovation," and the volume of pro-
duction and employment."0 For, if it were dear that the economic,
political, and social objectives are compatible, we would avoid the fuzzy
frustrations that beset the formulation of government policies in this
field. Conversely, if it were shown that a diminution of competition
would raise standards-of-living, we would have clearer-cut choices to
consider. Then, we could weigh and balance among the objectives more
effectively. We could decide whether we were willing to pay the price
for these social and political objectives, or whether we preferred higher
economic levels.81
ERA (1952). See also, GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF CoUN-
TERVAILING POWER (1952).
1 28 Seligman, Railway Tariffs and the Interstate Commerce Law, 2 POL. Sci. Q. 369,
373 (x887). Clark, The Limits of Competition, 2 POL. ScI. Q. 45, 55 (x887); Gun-
ton, supra note 15, at 406.
27 Villard, Competition, Oligopoly, and Research, 66 J. POL. ECON. 483 (1958);
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY (942); Hadley, The Good
and Evil of Industrizl Combinations, 79 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 377 (1897). Contra,
NUTTER, THE EXTENT OF ENTERPRISE MONOPOLY IN THE UNITED STATES 1899-1939,
26 (1951).
" For an a.frmat ve conclusion, see MONOPOLIES AND RESTRICTIVE PRACTICES
COMMISSION, REPORT ON THE SUPPLY AND EXPORT OF CERTAIN SEMI-MANUFACTURERS
OF COPPER AND COPPER-BASED ALLOYS para. 287 (x9s5); ANGLO-AMERICAN COUNCIL
ON PRODUCTIVITY, INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING (954); ANGLO-AMERICAN COUNCIL ON
PRODUCTIVITY, STEEL FOUNDING (1949); ANGLO-AMERICAN COUNCIL ON PRODUC-
TIVITY, MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING (i95o) ; HUTrON, WE Too CAN PROSPER (1953),
JEWCES, ORDEAL BY PLANNING (1948).
"
9 EDWARDS & TOWNSEND, BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 562, 564 (958).
" For a current British argument in favor of competition on this score, see EDWARDS
& TOWNSEND, op. cit. supra note 29. For a short discussion of the advantages and dis-
advantages of competition and monopoly, see WILCOX, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN
AMERICAN INDUSTRY (TNEC Monograph No. zi, 1940).
"'This question is implicit in Edward S. Mason's discussion of the writing of
Schumpeter, Berle, Lilienthal, and Galbraith. See Mason, The Apologetics of "Mana-
gerualism," 31 J. Bus. 1 (1958).
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If we were to adopt a consistent policy in favor of competition, we
could forge dearer criteria for the application of the economic tools of
analysis. We could then confine economic analysis of individual mar-
kets to the single criterion of whether they are competitive, without
having to evaluate social performance on a broader basis. We could
begin to develop a more logical pattern of government regulations. We
could avoid the serious inconsistencies which generate both rules that
encourage competition and regulations that stifle it. For example, in
order to strengthen the over-all policy, we might apply a firm policy to
promote competition even in those industries that might acquire greater
efficiency through monopolistic practices, on the ground that such a
consistent policy will produce better total results in our society. Con-
versely, if an in-between conclusion were reached, we would recognize
the need for developing a method to determine those industries that
do not require the same degree of competition as others. For example,
we might conclude to tolerate anticompetitive trends in certain defense
industries.82
We need a dearer understanding of the contribution of competition
even in the implementation of our economic objectives. In recent years,
we have progressed beyond the elemental objectives of higher efficiency
in the allocation of resources to the more advanced problems of growth
and stability.3 The contribution of competition to these more advanced
objectives is still uncertain. 84 There are some strong indications, frag-
mentary in nature, that competition contributes to growth.35 But, we
need more definitive analyses. The problem of stability has many facets
that are still to be uncovered.36 But, perhaps this area will not be ready
for exploration until economic stability is itself defined. Does it mean
stable employment, stable prices, steadily increasing employment, or
some balanced combination of the three?
B. Competitive Policies Broader Than Antitrust
The policy issues concerning competition are not confined to the
consideration of antitrust laws. They extend to many other phases of
" Judge Knox, among others, had to consider the national security problem in the
Alcoa case. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 347 (S.D.N.Y.
1950).
" Mason, Price Policies atd Full Employment, in FRIEDRICH & MASON (EDS.),
PUBLIC POLICY 25 (1940).
" For a discussion of the effects of competition on inflation and stability, see MEANS,
ADMINISTRATIVE INFLATION AND PUBLIC POLICY (1959). See also Jacoby, supra note ,.
"&See SIMONS, ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SocIETY (1948).
"6 See Reynolds, Wage Behavtior and Inflation, in WAGES, PRICES, PROFITS, AND
PRODUCTIVITY io9, iz6 (.959).
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government activity which have strategic influences on the competitive
framework. They apply to the many types of government regulation
on the federal, state, and local levels. They also cover a number of
nonregulatory activities.
Not all federal regulation is based on a clear competitive policy.
For example, the protective tariffs,37 quotas,8s and "Buy American"
regulations discourage foreign competition 3 9 tax laws encourage cor-
porate acquisitions and discourage corporate spin-offs; 40 regulation of
communications and transportation prevents new business entrants4' and
curtails rate competition.42 In addition, there is room for reasonable
doubt about the competitive effects of some federal regulations which
are supposedly dedicated to the protection of the small businessman.
Thus, the Robinson-Patman Act48 and the federal encouragement of
resale price maintenance have been criticized on this score.44
For a suggestion that tariffs be reduced for the products of an industry that has
violated the antitrust laws, see Probst, The'Failire of the Sherman Anti-trulst LaW, 75
U. PA. L. REv. 122 (1926). Several curious twists are found in tariff laws. Thus,
the President can suspend a tariff concession if an international cartel affects the item in
question. Trade Agreements Extension Act of 1955, 69 Stat. 162 (1955), 19 U.S.C.
§ 1351(a) (4) (1952). The Treasury can double the tariff on an item which is con-
trolled by exclusive dealing arrangements. 6o Stat. 433 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 93 (1952).
's Whittlesey, Import Quotas in the United States, 52 Q.J. ECON. 37 (1937-38).
For comment on the Buy American Act, see UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON FOR-
EIGN ECONOMIC POLICY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS 50 (1954).
oButters & Lintner, Tax and Non-Tax Motivations for Mergers, 6 J. FINANCE
361 (195i) 5 see also Lintner & Butters, Effects of Taxes on Concentration, in NATIONAL
BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 239
(x955). For a discussion of the specific problem of the tax effects of divestitures, see
Hearings Before the House Committee of Ways and Means on H.R. 8z26, Taxation of
Exchanges and Distributions Pursuant to Antitrust Decreei, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
41 See testimony of L. C. Halvorson, Hearings Before Senate Small Business Commit-
tee on ICC Administration of the Motor Carrier Zct, 84 th Cong., ist Sess. 121 (1956).
"Note, Antitrust Immunity in the Communications Industry, 44 VA. L. REV. 1131
(1958); STAFF OF SUBCOMM. No. 5, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 84.TH CONG.,
2D SESs., JUDICIAL DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION AS APPLIED IN ANTITRUST
SUITS (Comm. Print 1956). For a comment on the tendency of the ICC to raise truck-
ing rates to the level of railroad rates, see U.S. BUREAU OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS,
DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, BARRIERS TO INTERNAL TRADE IN FARM PRODUCTS (1939).
For a general discussion, see testimony of Marver H. Bernstein, Hearings Before Sub-
committee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on Monopoly Problems in
Regulated Industries, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 59 (957).
"3 STOCKING & WATKINS, op. cit. supra note 22, at 533, 538. COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC
ADVISERS THIRD ANN. REP. 15 (1948).
"See, e.g., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS, REPORT 49-55 (1955) i Herman, A Note on Fair Trade, 65 YALE L.J. 23
(x955). Contra, Adams, Resale Price Maintenance: Fact and Fancy, 64 YALE L.J. 967
(1955)5 Brandeis, Cutthroat Prices: The Competition that Kills, Harper's Weekly,
Nov. 15, 1913, p. 10.
[Vol. x96o: 157
COMPETITION
Two other problems on the federal level concern the competitive
effects of the various antitrust exemptions allowed for agriculture' and
for labor unions.46 These are exceedingly bothersome problems because
of their political overtones. Thus, labor unions have been able to charge
that some critics of labor's broad exemptions are really anxious to under-
mine all union power. Objective economic analysis of these two sectors
is badly needed if we are to achieve clear competitive policies.
State and local governments provide a host of regulations which limit
competition. For example, various farm measures limit and promote
price-setting by agricultural co-operatives. There are many substantial
barriers to interstate commerce,48 such as dairy inspection requirements
that limit the geographical areas of milk sheds,49 trucking regulations,
and state labeling requirements for various products. Price competition
is dulled by state regulations that permit fair trade 0 as well as by some
rules that practically compel control of resale prices.5 ' Provisions against
selling below cost," or loss-leader limitations frequently conceal arrange-
ments that boost prices substantially above the level of cut-throat pricing,
although they are represented as regulations that will merely raise
competition above this level. Many licensing rules limit entry into
various businesses and curtail the competitive potential.53 Such produc-
tion controls, as those affecting petroleum," add to these forces.' •
' See STOCKING & WATKINS, op. cit. supra note 22, at 539; ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT 311-13 0955);
Benedict, Attempts to Restrict Competition in Agriculture, 44 Am. EcON. REV. 93
(gs4).
"Reynolds, supra note 36, at 1355 MACHLup, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
MONOPOLY ch. 9 (1952); ATrORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITteE TO STUDY
THE ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT 304-06 (.955).
" Corwin D. Edwards argues that the policies of states and municipalities must be
"Influenced, so far as possible, toward patterns consistent with competition." EDWARDS,
MAINTAINING COMPETITION 291 (1949). See also id. at 312 for federal efforts to
influence state policies.
"
5U.S. BUREAU OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, BARRIERS
TO INTERNAL TRADE IN FARM PRODUCTS (1939); NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON" INTER-
STATE TRADE BARRIERS, TRADE BARRIERS AMONG THE STATES (1939).
"o For the extensive range of milk regulation, see 3 MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, STATE
MILK AND DAIRY LEGISLATION (1941).
:0 See 2 MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, STATE PRICE CONTROL LEGISLATION (1940).
'L See 4 MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, STATE LIQUOR LEGISLATION (1941), esp. R.I.,
NJ., and Ky. See also, MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, SPECIAL PRICE LEGISLATION (1942).
"
2 See 2 MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, STATE PRICE CONTROL LEGISLATION (1940).
5 Silverman, Bennett, & Lechliter, Control by Licensing over Entry into the Market,
8 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 234, 251 (1941) 5 MARKETING LAWS SURVEY, STATE OCCU-
PATIONAL LEGISLATION (1942).
"' The latest Interstate Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas may 'be found in Hearing
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Government purchasing is one of the important nonregulatory
activities that can have a profound effect on competition. "" Because of
the size and nature of federal, statei and local government purchases, "
for both military and civilian purposes, they cannot avoid influencing
competition and monopoly. Thus, if the bulk of research and develop-
ment contracts go to large companies, the long-run competitive effects
may be quite significant. If contracts providing for government assist-
ance in the construction of new facilities or for the purchase of existing
government plants are confined to a select few, competition is affected. 7
On the other hand, some federal purchases are so large that they could
be used to encourage new entrants in certain industries. If, in addition,
means could be found to co-ordinate between federal, state, and local
government purchases, it would be possible to exert a profound influ-
ence for competition.
C. Broad Analysis of Competitive Conditions
A realistic competitive policy requires a continuing diagnosis of'com-
petitive conditions in order to assist the Congress, the Executive, the
.judiciary, and public opinion.""
In recefit years, there have been many conflicting reports about the
state of competition. Some have reported a substantial weakening of
Before the Subcommittee on Communications and Power of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce on Interstate Oil Compact, 86th Cong., ist Sese.
(x959).
" Some elements of government purchasing are tied up with regulatory and volun-
tary activities under the Defense Production Act of 1950, § 7o8 (e) of which, as amended,
directs the Attorney General to make surveys to determine factors which may influence
competition, monopoly, and concentration of economic power. 65 Stat. 139 (195o),
50 U.S.C. § zo58(e) (1952). He is directed to study voluntary industry agreements
authorized by the Act. The Attorney General makes regular reports covering these
studies, to the Congress and President. See, e.g., ATToRNEY GENERAL, REPORT ON BOOK
AND MAGAZINE PAPER (9.59).
" It is estimated that in 1958 the federal government purchased $43,700,000,000
of goods and services, while state and local governments purchased $34,300,oo,ooo
worth. These compare with a total gross private product of $361,ooo,ooo,ooo. Eco-
NOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 143 (959).
" See testimony of Walter Adams, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Anstitrust
and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., ist Sess., esp. 4785
(9s9).
8 See EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 47, ch. 8; see also his testimony in Hearings,
supra note 57, at 48o6-07, and his letter to Senator Kefauver, id. at 4853; Berge,
The Atitrust Laws: A Symposium, 39 AM. ECON. REV. 691 (1949); STAFF OF THE
MONOPOLY SUBCOMM. Op THE HOUSE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 79TH CONG.,




competitive forces and an increase in concentration."9 Others have said
that competition has increased in recent years and that concentration is
no problem.60 However, flat assertions and the analysis of the deficient
data that are available provide uncertain bases for policy formation. 1
We badly need sharpened tools of empirical economic analysis that will
provide more profound, continuing evaluations of the state of competi-
tion in major industrial sectors and in our society. We need to develop
measurements of concentration that adequately portray economic power
in the economy, in regions, and in markets.6"
Similarly, we need to forge better tools to evaluate the effects of our
antitrust activity.6" We must find out whether the sum total of anti-
trust activity encourages competition, or merely changes some of the
forms of business activity.64 ' In the latter case, we need to evaluate the
desirability of these changes in form.
Unfortunately, current methods of evaluation make it tempting for
any national administration to build up the appearance of active enforce-
ment with only nominal accomplishment. The major gauges for meas-
uring antitrust activity are the following statistics from the FTC and the
Antitrust Division -of the Department of Justice: cases instituted; pro-
ceedings in court or ,other process; cases the Government has won and
lost; consent decrees and orders; and cases appealed. However, we do
not have satisfactory evaluations of the significance of these work loads
and accomplishments. We do not know what proportion of these cases
affect important companies in significant industries, or unimportant com-
I General Dissent of Louis B. Schwartz, in ATrORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COM-
ITEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT 390 (1955).
:0 E.g., G. L. Mehren, Bigness-Goodness or Badness?-In Thoje Who Feed Us,
address before the Commonwealth Club of California, Nov. 7, 1958- See EDWARDS,
op. cit. supra note 47, at 318, who feels that American competitive policy has had sub-
stantial effect, but who feels that there are substantial gaps "between aspiration and per-
formance." For surveys of studies in the field, see Heflebower, Monopoly and Compe-
tition in the United States of A4merica, in CHAMBERLIN (ED.),' MONOPOLY AND COM-
PETITION AND THEIR REGULATION (1954); and MASON, ECONOMIC -CONCENTRATION
AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM ch. I (1957).61 "No sort of an estimate concerning the comparative extent of competition and
monopoly in American markets is justified by the available evidence." WILCOX, Op. Cit.
supra note 30, at 308.
:2 See Edwards's testimony, Hearings, supra note 57, at 4809.
a See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITrEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS, REPORT 366 (1955)5 Report of the Committee, in WHITNEY, z ANTITRUST
POLICIES 44 (1958)-
" For an organized effort at such a valuation, see WHITNEY, op. cit. supra note 63.
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panies in insignificant industries. Nor can we judge whether adequate
attention is paid to trouble spots in the economy. 5
Unless we can attain more incisive analyses, it is difficult to see how
well-intentioned people in our antitrust agencies can obtain firm support
for realistic enforcement of our antitrust laws. Without such analyses,
Congress does not have a firm basis for determining what resources are
required for the effective application of our antitrust laws. Are larger
budgets necessary, or will they lead only to that proliferation of bureau-
cratic empires which would provide further illustrations of Parkinson's
law?
D. Analysis of Effects of Types of Decrees
Related to this over-all evaluation is the need for specific analyses
of the effects of court decrees and FTC orders. As pointed out earlier,
general language is employed in antitrust statutes in order to permit the
administrative agencies and the judiciary to develop the law case-by-
case. This reason implies an experimental approach that should call
for a close examination of results. But we experiment without examin-
ing the results. We have no organized program for reviewing the com-
petitive effects of individual decrees and orders. We do not know which
types of decrees promote competition in what types of business situations.
The need for such reviews is illustrated by the Standard Stations
case.6 The Supreme Court held that Standard Oil of California vio-
lated the Clayton Act when it entered into agreements which provided
that retail gasoline stations would purchase all of their gasoline, tires,
batteries, and accessories from" Standard. Therefore, those agreements
had to be canceled. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas raised a
The necessity for employing economic analysis to determine where to allocate
enforcement efforts was stressed in a review of antitrust enforcement which was com-
missioned by Judge Victor Hansen, then Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division. The full report of Dean E. T. Grether and Professor Carl Kaysen,
the economists who conducted .the review, was not published. However, a short mimeo-
graphed summary of their report was released. They seem to have stressed the need
for giving economists and economic analysis "a large role at the policy level." The
Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws felt that some
experienced staff lawyers and economists should be assigned solely to advise the Assistant
Attorney General regarding the advisability of instituting proceedings against individual
companies. ATroRNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS, REPORT 359 (i955). The Report says further, "Some have urged that the
Division on occasion, in anticipation of pretrial settlement, has brought weak cases."
Id. at 36o. See also STAFF OF SuBcoMM. No. x, HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL
BUSINESS, 85TH CONG., 7D SEss., LAW ENFORCEMENT AcrIviTi_,s AFFECTING SMALL
BUSINESS 3, .5 (Comm. Print x959).,
"Standard Oil of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
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troublesome query regarding the effect of such a holding on the objec-
tives of our antitrust policy. He argued that such a decree would induce
a large company to establish stations of its own instead of selling to
independent retailers. Justice Douglas felt that even though the re-
tailer might have to deal with one producer, under such an agreement,
he could maintain a degree of independence, which is quite important
politically. He contrasted this with the dependence of employees of
Standard who would run the same gasoline stations. Therefore, he
expressed considerable doubt about the majority decision, which was
regarded by some as a rather strict interpretation of the Clayton Act.
Now, we have here a strong position taken by a man who is known
to be deeply in favor of competition567 a man with wide experience in
the executive and judicial branches of the Government; one whose
opinion cannot be lightly dismissed. Nevertheless, we have no mecha-
nism for testing the question he raised, since no one bears the responsi-
bility for observing the effects of decrees.18
Without a continuing review of the effects of decrees, we have no
way of judging what types of decrees will provide constructive remedies
for any type of antitrust violation. We have theories, but we have no
empirical data. Therefore, though the formulation of a decree calls for
forecasts of the effects of various alternatives, we have practically no
guideposts based upon past experience.
This requirement for review calls for a discriminating analysis. It
would be fruitless to seek the one type of decree that would be effective
in every situation. We need incisive studies that differentiate between
various types of market conditions. With such analyses, the antitrust
agencies and the courts could perform their tasks more effectively and
we would have firmer policy guides.
, COUNTRYMAN (ED.), DOUGLAS OF THE SUPREME COURT esp. ch. 3 (1959). See
also Stocking, Economic Change and the Sherman Act: Some.Reflections on "Workable
Competition," 44 VA. L. REV. 537, 582 (.958).
" "The Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws points
out that the Antitrust Division is "responsible for the enforcement of some 378 judg-
ments entered since i8go" up to 1955. It found that despite occasional campaigns
compliance has usually been investigated only after complaints are received. ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT 366
(1955). For an interesting attempt by a judge to consider the effect of a decree, see
Judge Wyzanski's "Opinion on Remedy" in United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Corp., xio F. Supp. 295, 352, 354 (D. Mass. 1953). He proposed trying "milder
remedies" first with a provision: that both parties "report to this Court the effect of the
decree" ten and a half years after termination of an appeal; and that either party could
then propose a modification of the decree.
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E. Consent Orders and Decrees
The need for broad economic analysis of the effects of antitrust en-
forcement is enhanced by the pxtensive use of consent orders and con-
sent decrees. 9 Under the consent procedures, there are no trials of the
issues of fact or of law in either the courts or in hearings before trial
examiners at the FTC. The consent order or decree is formulated in
dosed-door negotiations between the lawyers for the defendants and
the lawyers for the antitrust agency. There is no public record spelling
out the reasons for filing a complaint, nor the basis for the decree.
Neither the general public, lawyers, nor economists have an opportunity
to examine fully the backgrounds for the consent decrees or orders.
The extent of this practice has not been widely recognized. During
the last five years, the consent procedure accounted for approximately
eighty-eight per cent of the civil decrees rendered in prosecutions by
the Antitrust Division."0 Roughly three-quarters of these consent de-
crees were negotiated by the parties before the Division filed a com-
plaint." During the same period, about seventy-one per cent of the
cease and desist orders issued by the FTC were negotiated, while four
per cent of the orders were issued when the respondents offered no
defense.72  In effect, roughly seventy-five per cent of the FTC's cease
and desist orders were issued without public hearings.
When the Department of Justice negotiates a consent decree before
filing a complaint, the public record probably does not disclose the full
reasons for the prosecution. Since the complaint is filed after the con-
sent decree has been agreed upon, the Department naturally would not
See Kramer, Modification of Consent Decrees: A Proposal to the Antitrust Divi-
sion, 56 MICH. L. REv. 1051 (1958), for a description of the extensive effects of con-
sent decrees.
"0 From 1954 to 1958, inclusive, the Antitrust Division won 144 civil cases in the
district courts. During the same period, the Division terminated 127 cases by consent
judgments. Figures were tabulated from information supplied by Victor R. Hansen,
Assistant Attorney General.
" Barnes, The Department of Justice and the Antitrust Laws, in VAN ClsE, UNDER-
STANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 125 (1955). "From 1935 to 194.5 approximately 1o9
antitrust actions ended in consent decrees. Of these 79 were entered within three days
after the complaint was filed." Id. at 133. In the second half of the i92o's, prefiling
negotiation was employed by the Antitrust Division in about z5 percent of the cases.
Id. at 135.
"From 1954 to 1958, inclusive, the FTC issued 834 orders. Five hundred and
ninety-six orders were issued with the consent of respondents; 3 1 orders were issued after
respondents defaulted or filed admission answers, and the remaining 207 orders were
issued after a contest. Figures were tabulated from information supplied by the FTC.
See Anderson, Settlement and Compliance Procedures, in 14 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
ANTITRUST SECTION REPORT, PROCEEDINGS AT THE SPRING MEETING 6o (1959).
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allege any charges which are not covered by the decree. Therefore,
there is no public record of any potential charges that are not reflected
in the decree.78
Without a continuing review of the consent orders, their back-
grounds and their effects, neither Congress, the Executive, nor the
public can have a satisfactory basis for evaluating the effects of our anti-
trust administration. Without such a review, the present procedure
can tempt the antitrust agencies to play a "numbers game" in response
to pressures from Congress and other sources for a militant prosecution
of the antitrust laws. The consent procedures make it relatively simple
to show a substantial record of prosecutions.
Without an adequate review of consent orders and decrees, there is
little assurance that all prosecutions involve substantial issues. There
have been prosecutions of small companies, in insignificant industries,
which have consented to rigorous decrees and orders simply to avoid
the great costs of litigation. A reasonable defense entails not only high
court costs and legal fees, but also a great deal of the time and energy
of important company executives, not to mention expensive preparation
of material in operating departments. Therefore, a small company
literally cannot afford to carry on the active defense of an involved case.
Hence, without some safeguards, the antitrust agencies can be so busy
with unimportant consent orders and decrees that the more important
competitive problems in the economy are neglected.74
Extensive use of consent procedures can give rise to broad issues of
equity in government regulation. Our legal system is designed to pro-
vide safeguards against undue prosecution and undue penalties. Among
those safeguards are provisions for public hearings and other procedural
restraints on administrative agencies."5  Since the Antitrust Division is
an executive agency, it is not confined by these restraints. Yet, it is diffi-
cult to distinguish between its consent procedures and those of the FTC.
In effect, the Antitrust Division operates as an administrative agency,76
"See the Schwartz dissent, supra note 59, at 390.
"See STAFF OF SUBCOMM. NO. i. HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL'BUSINESS, 85TH
CONG., 21) SEss., LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES AFFECTING SMALL BUSINESS 15, zi
(Comm. Print 1959). The Attorney General's National Committee says that some feel
that the Antitrust Division would be more selective in its cases if it had to try each case.
However, the Committee disagreed with this point of view. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWs, REPORT 36o (1955).
"See PRETTYMAN, TRIAL BY AGENCY (1959). The procedural restraints are
reflected in the Administrative Procedure Act, 6o Stat. 243 (x946), 5 U.S.C. § ioo6(c)
( gri).
"6 "In drafting and negotiating consent decrees, the Antitrust Division is not in the
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without the limitations provided by the procedural safeguards erected
around our administrative agencies. Further, because of the pressures
of heavy defense costs and the fear of treble-damage suits, the defendant
is frequently caught in a bad corner during the dosed-door negotiations
with either agency. Meanwhile, the agency's position is often formu-
lated by lawyers who are overly-enthusiastic about the "chase" at lower
levels and who are not reined-in by a thorough policy review in the
upper levels. This situation has, on occasion, produced orders and
decrees that appear to be considerably harsher than those which would
have been entered by the Commission or by a judge after an open hear-
ing.77 Since the procedural restraints on administrative agencies are
focused on public proceedings, they have little effect on the consent
procedures in the FTC and no influence on the work of the Antitrust
Division.
On the other hand, some have felt that there have been consent
decrees and orders which were too soft. It has been suggested that in
some instances, a court or hearing examiner would have imposed a
tougher order; further, that the lawyers supporting the complaint would
have presented stronger cases in public proceedings than the consent
orders seem to imply.78
These deficiencies do not necessarily make it desirable to eliminate
consent decrees. Consent procedures of some type are vital in the en-
forcement of our antitrust laws. 70 As we shall see, public antitrust pro-
position solely of a litigant in a law suit; rather it must necessarily assume many of the
attributes of an administrative tribunal." Kramer, supra note 69, at io66.
" See Watkins & Dirlam, Government Policy Toward Competition and Private
Pricing, in THE RELATIONSHIP OF PRICES TO ECONOMIC STABILITY AND GROWTH 513
(x958). See also Peterson, Consent Decrees: A Weapon of Anti-Trust Enforcement,
AS U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 34- (1950).
" STAFF OF SUBcOMM. No. 5, HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG.,
IST SESS., CONSENT DECREE PROGRAM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Comm. Print
1959). See also Hearings Before the Antitrust Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Com-
mitee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), especially the testimony of Victor
H. Kramer, former Chief of the Litigation Section of the Antitrust Division. Kramer
makes the point here, as well as in his article, supra note 69, that consent decrees curtail
the Antitrust Division's power to prosecute the defendants for antitrust reasons, since
they "settle" the relief which can be granted for activities up to the time of the suit.
For a further discussion of this point see Dabney, Antitrust Consent Decrees: How Pro-
tective an Umbrella?, 68 YALE L.J. 1391 (x959). See also STAFF OF SUBCOMM. No. i,
HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 85TH CONG., 7D SEss., LAW ENFORCE-
MENT ACTIVITIES AFFECTING SMALL BUSINESS 16 (Comm. Print 19sq).
" Stanley N. Barnes states the case for consent decrees in Settlement by Consent
Judgment, in SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, AN ANTITRUST
HANDBOOK 235 (1958). HAMILTON & TILL, ANTITRUST IN ACTION 88 (TNEC
Monograph No. 16, 194o), argue that the consent decree can be more meaningful than
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ceedings are so extended that requiring such an adversary hearing in
each case would place an intolerable strain on our administrative organi-
zation.8° Such a burden would force either a substantial enlargement
of the antitrust agencies, the courts, and the antitrust bar, or a drastic
curtailment of antitrust activity.
Here, then, is the dilemma: on the one hand, the consent procedures
are necessary for effective enforcement5 on the other hand, they can
lead to injustice, they can induce an agency to overlook important prob-
lems because it is busy building a paper record of accomplishment, they
can provide remedies which fall short of the mark, and they provide a
curtain which removes the proceedings from public scrutiny. To pose
this dilemma is not to deny that we have a number of capable fair-
minded men in our agencies, men who are anxious to promote fair,
rigorous applications of our antitrust laws. Rather, the issue is: what
can be done to assist these men in their goals and to provide more sig-
nificant policy evaluations of the operations of our antitrust agencies and
the effects of our antitrust laws. Until some process is developed to
meet this need, a most significant opportunity to apply the tools of eco-
nomic analysis in policy formation will be foreclosed.
III
ADMINISTRATION
From a broad institutional view, there are a number of participants
in the administration of our antitrust laws. The federal agencies include
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, and the Federal
Trade Commission as well as a number of other agencies, such as De-
partment of Agriculture, Federal Reserve Board, Interstate Commerce
Commission, and Federal Communications Commission. The Federal
District, Appeals, and Supreme Courts are important participants. In
this context, many lawyers have significant roles in the administration,
whether they represent the Government, plaintiffs in treble-damage
suits, or defendants.
If it is to be effective in the field of competition and monopoly, eco-
nomic tools of analysis must fit into the framework of this administra-
tive structure. The mere transfer of methods of economic analysis that
litigated decrees because they "can attempt to shape remedies to the requirements of
industrial order."
'
0As early as 194
.
, it was estimated that the government's costs in litigating an
antitrust case ranged from $100,000 to $15o,ooo. HANDLER, A STUDY OF THE CON-
STRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 92, (TNEC Mono-
graph No. 38, 194-1).
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are useful in policy formulation will not meet this need. The methods
for applying analyses differ, as do the advisory needs.
One of the road-blocks against the practicable use of economic analy-
sis in anti-trust administration is a confusion between the roles of the
economists in policy-making and in administration. During the process
of legislative policy formulation, the economist is expected to engage in
free-wheeling analysis, free of the fetters of existing regulation. Cur-
rent laws and their administration are operating data that he must cover
in his analysis; they are not restrictions. Indeed, at the legislative level,
the economist can use the lawyer to assist in supplying legal interpreta-
tions and in legislative drafting.
In contrast, the lawyer runs the administrative show. Here, the
economist is the assistant, aiding the lawyer in ideas, preparation of
material, and analysis. Here, the economist must accept the limits of
the existing law and operate within them.8
This distinction has been stated rather baldly here in order to point
up the differences in the functions. Obviously, the differences are not
black-and-white. They are found in varying shades of gray. Since
policy formulation is not confined to the Congress, economists have to
advise lawyers on policy on many occasions. Thus, they must be pre-
pared to advise the lawyers who are called on for legislative recom-
mendations.
However, the main point remains. Economists frequently confine
their analysis unnecessarily, within the limitations of existing law, when
they discuss policy. On the other hand, they frequently fail to recog-
nize the task of the lawyer in the administration of current regulation
and overlook pertinent operating problems.
Let us illustrate the differences in the application of economic analy-
sis in policy-making and in administration. When the Robinson-Patman
Act was under consideration, there was concern lest the Act stifle market-
ing innovations that might lower distribution costs. As will be recalled,
the Robinson-Patman Act is aimed at price differences that may injure
competition. Some members of Congress wanted to be sure that the
Act would not restrain low-cost methods of distribution, even though
they might hurt those competitors who followed the older methods.
8 2
81 In this connection, the economist's role is no different from that of the judge or
lawyer. See Judge Lindley's comment about the functions of the judge in Corn Products
Refining Co. v. FTC, 39 F.T.C. 664, 669-70 (1944): "When a standard of conduct
has once been fixed by legislative enactment, the only functions of the judiciary, as a
coordinate branch of government, are so to interpret the statute as to promote and effec-
tuate the disclosed intent of Congress."
" For an excellent discussion of the legislative background of the Act, see EDWARDS,
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To avoid this danger, the law permitted a seller to pass his cost savings
on to his lower-cost customers. For example, if a food packer's costs in
selling to supermarket chains were lower than in selling to small re-
tailers, he could sell to the chain at discounts which were as large as his
cost savings, even though competing small grocers might be hurt.
Now, at the time the Act was under congressional scrutiny, most
economists working in the field were convinced that the provision for
cost justification of lower prices was not practicable. 3  Both the econo-
mists and the cost-accountants knew that techniques of cost-accounting
were not definitive enough to make this cost justification a tolerably
workable defense. In fact, there was agreement that conventional cost-
accounting methods produced data on average costs, and not on cost
differentials; that costs of distribution and administration, the principal
areas in which such cost differences might be found, were regularly
treated as average percentages of sales volume; therefore, cost dif-
ferentials could not be readily measured by ordinary industrial cost-
accounting.84 Incidentally, many economists were concerned about this
provision because they feared that it might be an opening wedge for a
policy of price-setting by cost formulas. At any rate, it seemed dear
to these economists that the cost proviso was not a practicable tool to
avoid a tendency to freeze methods of distribution if the Act were
enacted.
Conceivably, if Congress had been given a clear understanding of the
impracticability of the cost proviso, many legislators would have been
concerned about the law's effect on lower distribution costs. They might
have voted against the bill, and it might not have passed.
Here, then, we have an example of the basic difference between
economic analysis in policy-making and in administration. When the
Robinson-Patman Act was under consideration, the tools of economic
PRICE DISCRIMINATIONS LAWS: A REvIEW OF EXPERIENCE (the Brookings Institution,
1959).
S8 This lack of practicality has been reflected in administration. The then Chairman
of the FTC, Edward F. Howrey, said that "the fact remains that the cost defense has
proved largely illusory." Quoted in TAGGART, COST JUSTIFICATION 533 (.959).
The same position was taken by the ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO
STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT 171 (i955). It is interesting to note the dif-
ferences in the treatment of costs by the FTC and the Canadian Restrictive Trade Prac-
tices Commission. The Canadian agency regards cost proof as a much less precise
activity than does the FTC. See the REPORT CONCERNING THE WHOLESALE TRADE IN
CIGARETTES AND CONFECTIONERY IN THE EDMONTON DISTRICT (1958).
"' Massel & Gormley, Business Methods and Antitrust Policy: The Automatic Can-
teen Case, i ANTITRUST BUL. 361, 467 (1955). For a detailed discussion of the
applications of cost accounting in FTC cases, see TAGGART, op. cit. supra note 83.
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analysis relating to cost structures and cost behavior should have been
brought to bear on the policy issue. Such analysis would have called
for a strong stand regarding the impracticability of the cost defense.
However, when the law was passed, the economist's help was needed to
develop methods of measuring cost differentials as an aid to the lawyers
for the FTC and the respondents, and to the courts. At that stage,
preoccupation with the argument against the cost proviso would fore-
dose the usefulness of economic analysis as an affirmative aid in ad-
ministration.
If he is to participate in administration, the economist must accept
the limits of existing law. Such acceptance by the economist engaged in
administration does not, of course, imply that economists generally
should overlook the importance of continuing to review the effects of
the law and its administration in considering policy issues-such as the
continuation or the enforcement of the law.
A. Analytical Tools Must Be Operational
The economist's tools must be operational within the framework of
the legal system to be useful in the field of antitrust."5 Otherwise, many
lawyers will cling to their general argument that economists do not offer
practical help.80
In litigation, economic tools of analysis must fit within the context
of the lawyer's methods for considering antitrust problems. If they
are to be utilized by lawyers, they cannot require direct application of a
rounded structure of economic theory.88 Thus, it does not seem pos-
sible, in the near future, to get courts or administrative agencies to use
" See Markham, Economic Analysis, in SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AMERICAN
BAR ASS'N, AN ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 373 (1958).
" See, e.g., Howrey, Coalescence of Legal and Economic Concepts of Competition
(1955). For an amusing statement of a general attitude towards economists, see Gordon,
Walking Backward Into the Future, in How To COMPLY WITH THE ANTITRUST LAWS
45 (1954).
"' Stocking suggests that some technical economic concepts require the skill of an
economist and may not be of much use in the hands of a judge. See his specific point
regarding "cross-elasticity" in this connection. Stocking, Economic Change and the
Sherman Act: Some Reflections on "Workable Competition," 44 VA. L. REy. 537, 570
(1958).
5 8Yankwich, "Short Cuts" in Long Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41, 58 (195i): "I am of
the view that while economic facts have a place before the court in these cases and an
economic expert might help summarize them, and, if the situations are very complicated,
give his opinion as to the inferences to be drawn from them, economic theories are out of
place in the average anti-trust case." For a discussion of economic inference, see
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.s. 293, 309 (1949); Timberg, The Rights of
Customer-Seller Selection, in COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, BUSINESS PRACTICES UNDER
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 15O (1g95) ; Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 7.
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a fully-defined model of competition in an industry as a yardstick. Few
lawyers, if any, would offer a systematic presentation of such a model in
order to establish the presence or absence of adequate competition. As
a matter of fact, economists have themselves been long on discussing this
method in theory and short on applying it in industry studies.
Economists must appreciate the legal setting of a trial in order to
understand the evidentiary problems.89 Otherwise, economic analysis,
which may be first-rate, may fall wide of the mark. Similarly, they must
recognize that there are cases that do not call for any economic analysis
even though the subject matter of the case may have substantial eco-
nomic effects. For example, in the General Motors Acceptance Corpora-
tiotz case, 0 the charge was that GM and GMAC had conspired to restrain
trade in violatidn, of the Sherman Act by forcing automobile dealers to
finance, customers' paper through GMAC. The Government produced
several dealer-witnesses who testified that they had been coerced. The
defendants sought to bring in dealer-witnesses to prove that most dealers
had not been coerced and that competition had not been restricted. The
court refused to listen to the defense witnesses on the ground that the
Government's witnesses showed that a conspiracy existed, even though
they were the only ones who were cberced. In effect, no economic evi-
dence of effective restriaint of trade was required to support the'Govern-
ment's, charges of 'conspiracy to restrain trade, though it would have
been essential tor support 'charge that trade had been restrained. Thus,
the intent to restrain was the central feature of the case, rather than the
possible success of the attempt.
Another difficulty in applying economic analysis ,arises because the
economist and the lawyer frequently use the same .words, but with
so For discussions of the rules of evidence, see Yankwich, supra note 88; Dession, The
Trial of Economic and Technological Issues of Fact, 58 YALE L.J. 1o 9 (i949)5
McAllister, The Judicial Conference Report on the "Big Case," 38 A.B.A.J. 289 (1952).
The rules of evidence have been "liberalized" by many courts in their consideration of
economic data. Thus, "The relevant political and economic facts can be presented to
the Court in an informal way. It is not necessary to comply with those minimal
standards of evidentiary competence suitable for the proof of other types of fact even
in the comparatively loose procedure commonly followed in a civil antitrust case where
the Government seeks an injunction." United States v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co.,
9z F. Supp. 947, 958 (D. Mass. 195o). For a discussion of the rules as they apply to
administrative agencies, see Administrative Procedure Act, 6o Stat. 243 (.946), 5
U.S.C. § ioo6(c) (1952) i LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT (1946) ; ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE TO STUDY ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-
CEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, REPORT (194-0).
9 United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 194..).
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different meaningsf' Take, for example, the term "price discrimina-
tion." In economic theory, price discrimination covers undue similari-
ties as well as undue differences in price."' Thus, a manufacturer who
sells to two customers at the same price would discriminate if there were
differences in his costs of selling to each of them. For in economic
theory, any prices which do not reflect cost differences are discriminatory.
In contrast, under such regulations as the -Robinson-Patman Acte8
and public utility legislation, a price discrimination occurs when there
is a difference in the prices charged to two customers who compete with
each other. Thus, if the same price is charged to two customers, there
cannot be a price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act, regard-
less of what differences there may be in cost.
Here, then, is the basic language problem: some price discrimina-
tion, as the economist defines it, will not fit the legal definitions some
price discrimination, under the legal regulations, will not meet the eco-
nomic definition; while some price differences would classify as price
discrimination under both definitions.
B. Opportunities to Apply Economic Analysis in Administration
In the administrative process, there are several fairly distinct oppor-
tunities to apply the tools of economic analysis.94
Effective administration of our antitrust laws calls, first, for concen-
tration on those industrial markets which require most attention. Anti-
trust agencies need to conduct a continuing review of the economy in
order to identify those industrial sectors in which competitive influences
I9 ArmORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS,
REPORT 316 (1955).92 EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COMPETITION (1945). For a discussion of the concept
in economic theory, see Clemens, Price Discrimination and the Multiple-Product Firm,
19 REv. EcON. STUDIES 1 (1951-52); ROBINSON, ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPE-
TITION chs. 15, 16 (1936). For a description of the types of discrimination, see
MACHLUP, op. cit. supra note 46, at 137-68; Cassady, Techniques and Purposes of Price
Discrimination, x J. MARKETING 135 (1946).
g'49 Stat. 1526 (1936), I5 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a, x3 b, zia (1952).
It might be noted, parenthetically, that this discussion is confined to equity pro-
cedures which lead to an order governing future activity. We are not covering crimi.
nal procedures, with or without a jury, or private treble damage actions. Though
there are a number of differences between the equity procedures and the criminal or
damage cases, the role of economic analysis is roughly the same in all three types of
legal actions, except for the determination of a remedy. In treble-damage actions, the
proof of damages calls for another economic analysis. After a criminal conviction, the




seem to be inadequate. 5 In this review, measurements of concentration
and criteria for gauging competitive conditions would be applicable.
However, there are few public indications that our antitrust agencies
have employed economic analysis to that end. By and large, except
for merger cases, the antitrust agencies seem to institute their investiga-
tions only after they receive protests from the public.9"
After a decision has been made to investigate a market, economic
analysis can be applied to find out whether there may be a violation of
the antitrust laws. Such a review calls for a determination of what are
the anticompetitive influences, what antitrust statute has been violated,
how good a case can be made, and what practical means there may be
for stimulating competition.
During the negotiations of a consent decree or order, the lawyers
for each side can use economic analysis to evaluate the strength of the
Government's case and the probable effects of a proposed decree.
During the course of the trial, as we shall see, economic analysis
can help to determine whether there has been an antitrust violation and
to formulate a decree which will cure the violation and stimulate com-
petition within a market:"
Lastly, on the government side, economic analysis could be profitably
employed to review thi effects of past antitrust proceedings. Such
analysis would enable the agencies and the courts to evaluate the rela-
tive merits of various types of decrees.
IV
TRIAL PROCEDURES
A quick look at the mechanics of the trial of antitrust cases may illus-
trate the nature of these general observations about administration. An
appreciation of these trial procedures is a prerequisite to an understand-
ing of the size, scope, and nature of economic analysis as a realistic aid
in antitrust administration.
To begin with, one must consider the conceptual framework of the
judicial process. This process is essentially one of selection. The
judge's primary function is to make choices regarding facts and law on
the basis of the evidence and the legal arguments presented to him in
open court. It is presumed that each adversary before the court will
" For a similar proposal see HANDLER, op. cit. supra note go, at 96.
00 HANDLER, op. cit. supra note So, at 9o HAMILTON & TILL, op. Cit. supra note 79,
ch. 3, contains an interesting description of "The Origin of the Suit."
* HAMILTON & TILL, op. dt. supra note 79, at i13, feel that it is not sufficient to
employ economists in this task. "The need is a round of skills shaped to the task.".
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present the strongest evidence and arguments on his side. The judge
is expected to base his decision soleIy* on the presentations made by the
adversaries. He does not strike out, on his own, to investigate other
data or other legal theories.
This procedure puts each adversary on notice of the evidence and
the legal arguments that the judge has under his consideration. There-
fore, if A hears B present evidence or legal arguments which are un-
favorable to A, he has full opportunity to present evidence or arguments
to counter the unfavorable material. Such an opportunity would not
be available if the judge were to conduct his own private investigation.
This open procedure is so firmly imbedded in our judicial traditions that
many legal scholars feel that our respect for the courts depends on it.
This theory of the judicial process is implemented by the various
stages of an antitrust trial:9 8 first,'the definition of the issues of the trial;
second, the c61lection of data; third, the presentation of the data,
within the rules of evidence and court procedure;9 9 fourth, the presen-
tation of 'arguments by the lawyers arialyzing the data and the law in
the light of the issues presented; fifth, the judicial sifting and determina-
tion of conclusions regarding the violation; and finally, the formulation
of'the decree'if a violation has been found. In some instances, and
these are becoming more common, decrees call for continuing judicial
supervision of certain behavior of the defendants after the trial. At each
stage, there are definite opportunities to employ economic analysis
effectively.
The starting point for an antitrust trial is, of course, the definition of
the issues. During this phase, the pleadings are presented. In some
instances, trial briefs outline the evidence which will be presented.
Pretrial conferences'00 may' be held between the judge and the counsel
9" For an interesting review of the techniques of arl antitrust trial, see Hollabaugh,
Development of an Antitrust Cse, in' SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AMERICAN BAR
ASS N, AN ANTITRUST HANDooK 241 (1958); Kramer & Schueller, Pleadings, Inter.
rogatories, Pre-Trial Conferences-, Particularization of Issues, and Trial Briefs, id. at
z55; O'Donnell, Civil Antitrust Trials, id. at 301.
9 For an interesting description of the obstacles provided to the efficient trial of an
antitrust case, see Corwin D. Edwards's description of the introduction of import statistics
in the Aluminum case. Edwards, Can the Antitrust Laws Preserve Competition?, 3o ALI,
EcoN. R~v. 164 (1940). However, there are many signs of practical relaxation of
some of the rules of evidence. See, e.g., FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 705
(1948) ; United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., x1o F. Supp. 295 (D.C. Mass.
1953).
'" The purposes of pretrial conferences are set forth in the report of the Judicial
Conference of the United States. The Report: Procedure in Antitrust and Other Pro-
tracted Cases, 13 F.R.D. 62, 72-73 (1951).
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for both sides to review the types of evidence that will be introduced
at the trial, and agreements may be developed regarding specific evi-
dence that will be acceptable to both sides. On occasion, both sides will
stipulate certain evidence so that the length of the trial may be shortened.
This phase of the trial frequently is of major import for an adequate
consideration of the economic issues. Many cases are lost by the plain-
tiff or defendant primarily because the economic issues were not dearly
defined before the trial began.1' 1
Before the start of the trial proper, the collection of data is the task
at hand. During this stage, the tools of economic analysis can be used
profitably for collecting data, handling problems of sampling, and de-
veloping statistical inference from the data.102 Important decisions have
to be made regarding sources of information, both quantitative and non-
quantitative, what published material can be used, how internal operating
information can be employed, what special studies should be undertaken,
and what information should be obtained through inquiry from the
other side. Here, as in the definition of the economic issues, economic
analysis can help to plan the strategy of the case.10
3
After the data have been developed, determining how best to present
them can involve some interesting problems. As we all know, the
presentation of complex economic data for easy understanding is an art
in itself. It calls for such a combination of testimony, explanation, and
visual aids that the judge who is not skilled in economic analysis can
grasp the economic situation-or overlook it, depending on what the
lawyer's strategy may be.'
When one side knows how the other will present its evidence, the
economist can suggest ways and means for disproving or counteracting
it. Sometimes, the other side's presentation is known before the trial
proper starts: on other occasions, it is learned only in open court.
101 Grether states this feature in terms of "economic evidence" and "economic argu-
ment." He points out the need for setting the "facts" in a "conceptual framework
provided by economic conceptions .... " Grether, supra note 5, at 58.
2
0 2 SOCIETY OF BusIniEss ADVISORY PROFESSIONS, STANDARDS OF PROBABILITY
SAMPLING FOR LEGAL EVIDENCE (Current Business Studies No. 26, 1957). Deming, On
Presentation of the Results of Sample Survey as Legal Evuidence, 49 J. AM. STAT. Ass'N
814 (.9s5).
104 See Grether, supra note s, for a discussion of the analysis of price behavior in
this connection. Markham, supra note 85. Howrey, Economic Evidence in Antitrust
Cases, address before American Marketing Association, June 14, 1954.
10' See Barne, Quantitative Data and Sample Surveys as Evidence in Judicial and
A4dministrative Procedures, address before Society of Business Advisory Professions, May




Needless to say, in the presentation of the case, the economist can be
used as an expert witness. However, many lawyers think of the econo-
mist solely as an expert witness, and they overlook the significant help
that the economist can offer in planning the strategy of the case. 105
A. Circumstantial Evidence
The trial of economic issues in an antitrust case almost always turns
on indirect or circumstantial evidence. Rarely is an antitrust case tried
on the basis of direct evidence alone.
Direct evidence is useful mainly in a trial which turns on simple,
uncomplicated issues of fact. Consider, for example, the testimony in a
murder trial of an eye-witness who saw the shooting. Here, it is possible
to prove that a specific crime took place, through the direct testimony.
Similarly, if a suit concerns a written agreement which was signed by
the parties, the presentation of the contract and direct evidence that it
was signed may be sufficient to establish the facts of the case.
However, antitrust cases are rarely tried on such direct evidence. 106
If the complaint charges that there is a price-flxing agreement, a written
contract that was signed by each party would be presented as direct
evidence. However, the government lawyer who finds such a written
agreement is fortunate, indeed. Usually, he can prove a price conspiracy
only by presenting circumstantial evidence that supports an inference
that there has been a price agreement. Further, if his case requires proof
that competition has been lessened (which proof is not necessary if the
charge is price-fixing),"' he cannot find any direct evidence of this phe-
nomena, since the lessening of competition is an analytical conclusion.
The treatment of circumstantial evidence involves a rather interesting
methodology, based upon the testing of a hypothesis. The plaintiff
presents his hypothesis, for example, that competition has been lessened
.0. Carl Kaysen makes this point forcefully in his account, op. cit. supra note 6.
The book reflects his experience as a "law clerk" to advise Judge Wyzanski who tried
the case. Kaysen feels that neither the government nor the company had the advantage
of an economic analysis of the industry in planning their offense and defense. He says,
"At the present writing, the recently decided suit against the investment bankers, United
States v. Henry S. Morgan, et al. (Civil No. 43-757, S. District of New York), is the
only completed case known to the writer in which the defense was planned with the aid
of economic analysis, ab initio. As yet, the use of economic analysis by the Government
is rudimentary."
108 It has been said, regarding one antitrust element, that "conspiracies are seldom
capable of proof by direct testimony and may be inferred from the things actually done."
Eastern States Lumber Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 6oo, 61z (1914). See also,
Interstate Circuit v. United States, 3o6 U.S. zoS 0930-
"" United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 50 (0940).
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because of certain market practices of the defendant. He then offers his
factual evidence, through testimony and exhibits. In some instances, he
offers opinions of expert witnesses regarding the validity of the informa-
tion presented and its implications. On completing his evidence, his
position is: (a) that his information is dearly compatible with his hy-
pothesis5 and (b) that this evidence is not compatible with any other
hypothesis; or (c) that, while it might conceivably be compatible with
another hypothesis, the possibilities are so remote that his hypothesis is
the only reasonable one.
Now, consider the position of the defense. The defendant's counsel
seeks to knock down the plaintiff's hypothesis. He may, in the unusual
case, persuade the court that the plaintiff's evidence is not compatible
with the hypothesis, without presenting any further evidence. More
frequently, the defendant does produce evidence. He may undertake to
disprove some of the evidence presented by the plaintiff by cross-examin-
ing the plaintiff's witnesses or producing other information that directly
controverts the plaintiff's evidence; at that point, the defendant may
argue that the believable part of the plaintiff's evidence is not compatible
with his hypothesis. Or, the defendant may introduce additional evi-
dence and argue that the total evidence is not compatible with the plain-
tiff's hypothesis. In some instances, in order to defeat the plaintiff's case,
the defendant may argue that the evidence at hand is more compatible
with a new hypothesis which would wreck the plaintiff's case.
It may be useful to illustrate this procedure. Suppose that the
Department of Justice has alleged that several competitors conspired
to fix prices in violation of the Sherman Act.08 The Department does
not have a written contract and cannot produce direct oral testimony that
there was a price agreement. It shows that several competitors, located
at widely-separated points, submitted identical bids for "widgets" on a
government contract at a price of $8.73445 per gross, delivered in Wash-
ington, D. C. It shows further, that over a period of several years, the
prices of each of these competitors were changed at approximately the
"'5 There has been a substantial discussion about a doctrine of "conscious parallelism"
and about the use of basing points as circumstantial evidence of price conspiracy. See,
e.g., Kittelle & Lamb, The Implied Conspiracy Doctrine aid Delivered Pricing, I5 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 227 (1950) ; Sunderland, Changing Legal Concepts in the Anti-
trust Field, 3 SYRACUSE L. REV. 6o (x9xp); ECONOMIC INSTITUTE OF THE U.S. CHAM-
BER OF COMMERCE, DELIVERED PRICING AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN BUSINESS
(194-8); SPECIAL COMM. OF THE SECTION ON ANTI-TRUST LAW, N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N,




same time. It argues that these events could not have taken place unless
there had been an agreement.
The defendants deny the charge. They prove that the peculiar price
of $8.73445 is the mathematical result of applying a series of percentage
discounts to list prices. They show that these are the largest discounts
they allow to any customeri further, the industry has sold to the Govern-
ment at its lowest prices since 1932, when a government purchasing
agent induced a wholesaler to make a purchase for the Government
with no mark-up. They prove that the industry has always sold its
products at delivered prices that are uniform in every state east of the
Rockies; that, while the prices of each company did move together, the
first company to cut a price was not always the same; and that there were
occasions when one company raised its prices but had to cancel the in-
crease because other competitors did not follow suit. Further, the
defendants account for less than seventy-five per cent of the volume of
the industry. Therefore, they did not and could not control prices or
enter into an effective price conspiracy. Hence, they argue that the
evidence presented, taken as a whole, is compatible only with the hy-
pothesis that competition set the industry's prices.
The judge must consider, on the one hand, the plaintiff's hypothesis
that there was a price conspiracy and, on the other, the defendant's that
prices were set by the free operation of a competitive market. He must
test them by sifting through the evidence, considering what is more
plausible and deciding which hypothesis is more compatible with this
evidence.10 9 However, he cannot make a field investigation himself.
He must base his decision on what has been presented in open court.
It might be noted, parenthetically, that the hypothesis-and-test
method of considering circumstantial evidence is not unique. This essen-
tially is the methodology used in empirical economic analysis. It rests
on the same foundation as the methodology followed in the physical,
the natural, and the social sciences. 10
Since the treatment of circumstantial evidence requires formulating
and testing hypotheses, the trial of economic issues in antitrust cases calls
for the clear application of the methodology of economics. The stages
of an antitrust trial, outlined above, with the definition of issues, presen-
tation of data, and the analysis of the data in the light of the issues is
..9 For a discussion of standards for evaluating circumstantial evidence, see Dession,
sutra note 89, at 1046.
110 For a general discussion of the use of hypotheses, see COHEN & NAGEL, AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO Locic AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD (1934). See also VEBLEN, THE PLACE
OF SCIENCE IN MODERN CIVILIZATION (1971).
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similar to the prosecution of empirical economic analysis. The formula-
tion of a theoretical framework for the empirical investigation closely
resembles the formulation of the theory of the case. The trial of the
issues calls for adversary proceedings. However, the over-all shape of
the trial presents an interesting parallel to economic studies of the same
types of problems.
Before leaving this discussion of evidentiary procedures, it may be
interesting to consider its connection with recent debates on the nature
of antitrust rules of law. It may be recalled that there have been a
number of complaints1 1 recently that the courts are applying too many
per se rules in antitrust cases and too few "rule of reason" rules.112
Roughly differentiating, a per se rule does not require a court to inquire
into the economic effects of a practice, while the rule of reason does so
require.113 For example, if a price conspiracy is proved, one of the
per se rules applies and the Government does not have to show that the
price agreement may lessen competition. In contrast, if there is an
attack on a corporate merger, the Government must introduce evidence
to show that it may tend substantially to lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly.
Because of the reliance on circumstantial evidence in most antitrust
proceedings, the contrast between per se and rule of reason has been
somewhat exaggerated." 4 Differences do exist, but they are not in the
"' E.g., Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National
Antitrust Policy, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1139 (1952); Lockhart & Sacks, supra note 7-
Contra, Stocking & Watkins, op. cit. supra note 22, ch. 9; Rowe, Borderland Issues in
Court and Comnmission Cases Under Sections 2 and 3 of Clayton Act, in SECTION OF
ANTITRUST LAW, AmERICAN BAR ASS'N, PROCEEDINGS 6o (x956); Austern, The Su-
preme Court and Section 3 of the Clayton Act-The Standard Oil of California Decision,
in ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 43 (195o) ; Meriam, The Sherman Antitrust Act and
Business Economics, in id. at 93.
12 For a history of the development of the rule of reason, see Handler, The Judicial
Architects of the Rule of Reason, lo AMERICAN BAR ASS'N ANTITRUST SECTION, REPORT
21 (1957). For a brief discussion of the differences between the two rules, with a list
of cases illustrating their application, see Oppenheim, supra note ill, at l150-52. See,
also, ATrORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS,
REPORT ch. i and 390-91 (i955) ; HANDLER, op. cit. supra note 8o.
11. "The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regu-
lates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress
or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily
consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition
before and after the restraint was imposed5 the nature of the restraint and its effect,
actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason
for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts." Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). -
... See Mason, Market Power and Business Conduct: Some Comments on the Report
of the Attorney General's Committee on Antitrust Policy, in ECONOMIC CONCENTRATION
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day-or-night category. Thus, in our illustration of a price-fixing case,
there was no direct evidence; circumstantial evidence involved the struc-
ture of the market and the behavior of competition; in fact, it did not
fall far short of the evidence needed to "prove" that competition was
lessened. Proof of some per se violations can delve as deeply into eco-
nomic analysis as proof of some rule-of-reason violations."' This fea-
ture is not a complete negation of the differences between per se and rule
of reason. It merely suggests that the contrast may have been over-
drawn.
B. The Judicial Burden
The task of sifting evidence and relating it to the hypotheses con-
stitutes a key element in the judicial function."' 0 Considerations of the
arguments about the law is the other part. Frequently, economic analy-
sis affects the interpretation of both statutes and judicial precedents.
The distinctions between issues of law and fact are frequently fuzzy,
especially when economic interpretations are involved. However, we
are considering only issues of "fact" here, as if the distinction were
clear.
1 7
To appreciate the judicial burden in an antitrust trial, one must
recognize the tremendous size of the task." 8  Many proceedings pose
such complex problems of economic analysis that the judge's task would
be formidable even for an able, experienced economist." 0 To illustrate
the "physical" size of the task, here are some extreme examples.
AND THE MONOPOLY PROBLEM 389 (1957). "On the other hand, the rule of reason-
even in its 'most reasonable' application-has never, in fact, examined very far into the
effects of a challenged course of business conduct. At most it has pursued economic
investigation one or two steps beyond the point at which per se would have carried it."
Id. at 394.
11 For a dear illustration of the need to analyze market effects in order to try a
case of price fixing, see American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 93 (6th Cir.
1944)
, 
aff'd, 328 U.S. 781 (1946). See also, Morton Salt Co. v. United States, 235
F.2d 573 (ioth Cir. 1956).
... For a general discussion, see Dession, supra note 89.
... The problem in applying this distinction is developed in a comment by Lord
Bramwell. "No evidence is given in these public policy cases. The tribunal is to say,
as a matter of law, that the thing is against public policy and void. How can the judge
do that without any evidence as to its effect and consequences?" Mogul Steamship Co.
v. McGregor, Gow & Co., [1892] A.C. 25, 45.
.18 McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 HARV.
L. REV. 27 (.950).
... Many judges feel strongly about this burden. Thus, Mr. Justice Jackson wrote,
"I regard it as unfortunate that the Clayton Act submits such economic issues to judicial
determination." Standard Oil Co. of California v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 322
(1949). For an additional comment on the ability of judges to appraise economic data,
see footnote 13 in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion.
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The trial of the Aluminum Corporation of America case 2 ° lasted over
a period of two years and two months. During that period, the judge
heard 153 witnesses fill up 58,ooo pages of testimony. In addition, he
had to consider 15,000 pages of documentary evidence. 2' Similarly, in
the recent Pillsbury case before the FTC, the hearing examiner had to
contend with 31,000 pages of testimony.
Compare the size of these records with the material covered in a
respectable industry study. Remember, however, that it is the rare
judge who has had the benefit of an education in economic analysis.'22
Further, in keeping with the general framework of the judicial function,
the judge does not enjoy the economist's opportunity to discuss his ideas
with other economists during the course of his study.
To develop more effective use of economic tools of analysis in such
trials, we urgently need to devise ways to help our judges to develop
skills of their own or to provide them with skilled assistance. Yet, this
task is formidable. 2
C. Use of a Judge's Economist
What would seem to be an obvious solution for this problem will
not fit the needs of the situation. At first blush, it would seem reason-
able to supply the trial judge with an economist who would review the
evidence and consult with him. 24 However, such a practice would
.2 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 44 F. Supp. 97, 104- (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
'2 McAllister, supra note xiS, at 58. For some other interesting figures, see the
article's discussion of United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, zo5 F. Supp. 215
(S.D.N.Y. 1952) ; United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., iio F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953); Henry S. Morgan or Investment Bankers case. See also The Report:
Procedure in Anti-trust and Other Protracted Cases, 13 F.R.D. 6z (953).
22 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 346 U.S. 894 (1953). "Judges
in prescribing remedies have known their own limitations. They do not ex officio have
economic or political training. Their prophecies as to the economic future are not
guided by unusually subtle judgment. They are not so representative as other branches
of the government. The recommendations they receive from government prosecutors
do not always reflect the over-all approach of even the executive branch of the govern-
ment, sometimes not indeed the seasoned and fairly informed judgment of the head of
the Department of Justice. Hearings in court do not usually give the remote judge as
sound a feeling for the realities of a situation as other procedures do. Judicial decrees
must be fitted into the framework of what a busy, and none too expert, court can super-
vise. Above all, no matter with what authority he is invested, with what facts and
opinion he is supplied, a trial judge is only one man, and should move with caution and
humility."
1 For an interesting discussion of the judge's task, see HAMILTON & TILL, op. cit.
supra note 79, at 70-74.
1' However, the Attorney GeneraPs National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws
did "not feel an independent staff of economic experts should be provided to assist courts
in the trial of antitrust cases no matter how involved. The place of an economic expert
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run counter to the basic premises of the judicial trial, since it fails to give
each adversary an opportunity to counteract any argument or evidence
that has been presented to the judge.
During the trial of the United Shoe Machinery case, Judge Wyzan-
ski, a jurist of outstanding ability, decided that he needed help on the
complex economic issues of the case. Accordingly, he appointed Pro-
fessor Carl Kaysen of Harvard University as his law clerk to advise him.
There is no dear record of what happened between the judge and his
"law clerk." However, one can only presume that the judge relied
heavily upon the interpretations offered by a "clerk" of such capacity.
Unfortunately, this procedure overlooked a conflict with strategic
elements in the judicial process. As pointed out before, the premise of
our trial procedure is that the judge will base his decision entirely on
the evidence and arguments presented to him in open court. Within
narrow technical limits, he may take "judicial notice" of certain public
information, available to anyone. However, he is not supposed to base
his decision on any of his own library or field research, nor is he supposed
to act on any advice which he has received outside the presence of the
lawyers for both parties.
The basis for this rule is a keystone in the structure of our legal sys-
tem, with its many protections against Star Chamber proceedings. It is
based upon the premise that all judicial decisions should be openly made
on the basis of open evidence.125 It is intended to afford each party a
full opportunity to counter evidence or opinions that may hurt his cause.
If the trial judge takes under consideration some information or
expert opinion that is not known to the adversaries before him, the party
who may suffer has no opportunity to counteract that evidence or opinion.
If the injured party had been aware of the opinion or evidence, he might
have presented other data or arguments against it. Such an opportunity
is not available to either party if the judge engages in private discussion
with an economist.
Here, then, is another dilemma. Our judges, able though they may
be as lawyers, do not, with few exceptions, have the background for
effective use of these tools of economic analysis. Nevertheless, we ask
in antitrust trials is no higher than an expert in any field, namely, as a witness on the
stand, where his opinions meet the test of analysis and cross-examination as well as of
contradicting, supplementing or explanatory testimony." ATroRNEY GENERAL's NA-
TIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS, REPORT 366 (-955). Cf. pro-
posal of Oppenheim that a staff of economists be set up for assignment to judges who
request their assistance. Oppenheim, 4 New Look at 4ntitrust Enforcement Trends,
ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM 83 (1950).
"'
5 FULLER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1949).
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them to analyze long records of highly-involved economic data. On the
one hand, we assume that they do need help. On the other hand, the
considered advice of economists, which would be most helpful to them,
does not easily fit into the framework of our judicial system. 20
It is interesting to note a lecture given by Judge Wyzanski just about
the time he had the United Shoe Machinery case under consideration.2
In those lectures, he raised some questions regarding a judge's use of
research which was not made available to the parties before the court.
He suggested one possible solution which merits consideration: that, if
a court uses material based upon outside work, the "better course may be
to submit the material (to the parties) for examination, cross-examina-
tion and rebuttal evidence."
The difficulties of this problem are matched by its importance. Until
practicable solutions are found, the effective utilization of tools of eco-
nomic analysis in antitrust as well as other trials will be sharply limited.
D. Formulating Decrees
After a judge has decided that the antitrust laws have been violated,
his next problem is to formulate a decree. At this stage, he should be
able to consider economic evidence regarding the competitive effects of
various alternative decrees. The trial is not a sporting contest governed
by an umpire whose sole task is to name the winner. 128 The goal of an
equity case is not how to punish a violator, but how to inject more com-
petition into a market. 29
On the whole, it seems fair to say that the courts have had even less
'2* The problem has become so important that the Judicial Conference of the United
States set up a committee, under Judge E. Barrett Prettyman, Chief Judge, Circuit Court
of Appeals of the District of Columbia, to consider it. Among other recommendations,
the committee suggested the submission of complicated questions to an expert or a panel
of experts serving as special masters for the court. The issue of fact would be submitted
to the special master or panel. Hearings would be held. The master or masters would
make a written report to the court which would be subject to exceptions and argument
by the parties. Procedure in Anti-trust and Other Protracted Cases, 13 F.R.D. 62, 8o
(x953). A contrary view was held by the Special Committee of the Section of Antitrust
Law of the American Bar Association, Streamlining the Big Case, in PROCEEDINGS AT
THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE SEcTION OF ANTITRUST LAW 25z (1958). See also,
Sink, The Unused Power of a Federal Judge to Call His Own Expert Witness, 29 So.
CALIF. L. REV. 195 (1956).
15 Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HAR. L. REV. Iz8s,
1295-96 (.952).
... "There is no merit in the ceremony of finding a violation unless something like
adequate relief is to be granted." Levi, supra note 17, at 18z.
159 Rostow makes this point in comparing criminal and equity remedies. Rostow,
supra note iS, at 589. For a discussion of types of decrees that set down rules for busi-
ness behavior, see Marcus, Impact on Business of Antitrust Decrees, is VAND. L. REv.
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economic guidance in formulating decrees than in finding violations.
Similarly, lawyers for the antitrust agencies have had little economic
advice in formulating consent decrees or orders,'3
An indication of the importance of economic analysis in formulating
orders can be found in three recent decrees which were issued after suc-
cessful antitrust attacks on collusive pricing.18' In substance, each of
these ordered individual companies to set prices on the basis of their
costs, plus the margin of profit they desired, and "other lawful con-
siderations." Economists generally associate this method of cost-plus
pricing with monopolistic conditions. It may be recalled that similar
formula pricing was written into many NRA codes." 2
The most serious deficiency involved in the promulgation of such
decrees is the fact that there is no agency to study their effects. In
theory, such decrees are deficient, since they appear to foster monopo-
listic, rather than competitive, forces. However, it is possible that in
practice, they may provide effective bases for promoting competitive
pricing. Remember that these competitors had agreed on prices. If
they were told merely to discontinue the agreement, each company
303 (1958). See also Report of the Committee, in WHITNEY, op. cit. supra note 63, at
443. Courts have enunciated this goal on a number of occasions. See, e.g., Hartford-
Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 435 (x945) ; United States v. National Ass'n
of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485 (x95o) ; Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 593, 603 "(x95). Justice Jackson said, "In an equity suit, the end
to be served is not punishment of past transgression, nor is it merely to end specific
illegal practices. A public interest served by such civil suits is that they effectively pry
open to competition a market that has been closed by defendants' illegal restraints."
International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947). See HAMILTON &
TILL, op. cit. supra note 79, at 86, discussing the technique of regulation: "It is slow,
clumsy, inefficient; and it is usually a moral victory, rather than an industrial corrective,
which a resort to law will yield."
180 For an interesting discussion of the problem of formulating FTC orders, see
Shniderman, Federal Trade Commission Orders Under the Robinson-Patman Act: An
Argument for Limiting Their Impact on Subsequent Pricing Conduct, 65 HARv. L. REv.
750 (195z). An excellent analysis of the problems of decrees under the antitrust laws and
of their purposes is contained in Timberg, Equitable Relief under the Sherman Act, 195o
U. ILL. L.F. 629. Timberg's final conclusion: "Whether he wills it or not, the antitrust
advocate, if he desires to make an adequate approach to problems of antitrust relief,
becomes a practicing economist and a co-developer of public law and public policy."
Id. at 658. Levi, suggests the possible merit of setting up an office, with no regulatory
functions, which could advise the courts on appropriate remedies. Levi, supra note x7,
at 183. See also KAYSEN, op. cit. supra note 6, at 343-44.
1. United States v. New England Concrete Pipe Corp., 1958 CCH Trade Cas. 73,
715; United States v. L.A. Young Spring & Wire Corp., 195o-5x CCH Trade Cas. 64,
750; United States v. Gold Filled Mfrs. Ass'n, 1957 CCH Trade Cas. 73, 105.
. For a description of these cost protections, see NELSON, MINIMUAI PRICE REGU-
LATION UNDER CODES OF FAIR CoMPETIION (1936).
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might continue its old prices "without agreement." The cost-plus order
might jar the price situation enough to start a new pricing pattern in
motion. Then, if "other lawful business considerations" were taken to
mean that prices could be reduced to meet competition, a competitive
situation might develop. It might be observed, parenthetically, that
fears of Robinson-Patman prosecution might reduce the testing and
probing of the market that seems to be the hallmark of competition in
an oligopolistic industry.
The essential point here is that we should not continue to depend
upon theoretical evaluations of these decrees. We require a mechanism
for employing empirical economic tools to give us some analytical pre-
dictions of the effects of various types of decrees. 83
An increasing number of antitrust decrees require some judicial
supervision over a period of time. 84 For example, we have the cost-
plus decrees discussed above. Similarly, there are a goodly number of
orders providing that patents should be licensed at reasonable royalties
and allowing prospective licensees to petition the court to set the royal-
ties.8  Again, in several recent cases, defendants were ordered to sell,13
as well as lease, certain types of machinery5 the decrees specified the rela-
tionships between the sales prices and the rental rates charged for the
same machines. In each such case, the affirmative action required of
the defendant presupposes that the court will be available to supervise
the action.
No mechanism has been established to aid the judges in this super-
vision. 37  In some instances, private petitioners can be expected to police
"'For a general description of various types of decrees, see Kilgore, Antitrust Judg-
nents and Their Enforcement, in SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, AMERICAN BAR AsS'N,
AN ANTITRUST HANDBOOK 340 (1958).
... At least one decree provides for court supervision over prices as a regular pro-
cedure. United States v. ASCAP, 195o-si CCH Trade Cas. 63, 750. See ASCAP and
the Antitrust Laws: The Story of a Reasonable Compromise, 1959 DUKE L.J. z58;
Timberg, The Antitrust Aspects of Merchandising Modern Music: The 1SCAP Consent
Judgment of r95o, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 294. (1954).
"" "Since the early forties, some ninety-odd antitrust judgments have contained pro-
visions for compulsory licensing [of patents] at reasonable royalties." Marcus, The
Impact on Business of Antitrust Decrees, 11 VAND. L. REv. 303, 306 (1958). The de-
cree in United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 46 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. Ohio 194z),
modified, 323 U.S. 386 (1945), called for a rather complex pattern of setting royalty
rates for patents, rental rates for machines, and prices for machines. After this long
complicated procedure, the Antitrust Division provided, in consent decrees, that prospec-
tive licensees could ask the courts to set reasonable royalties.
... Mund, Refusal to Sell, xi VAND. L. REV. 354 (x958), lists a number of antitrust
judgments which contain compulsory-selling provisions.
xm "The court lays down the lawi but it possesses no facilities for seeing that the
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the decrees by demanding patent licenses and complaining to the court
if the royalties charged are unreasonable. In others, the Antitrust
Division may keep tabs on the industry and petition the court to enforce
its orders. 8 " However, there are few public signs that the Division has
organized itself for such a surveillance. When the new petitions are
filed, lawyers will "battle it out" before the courts in the same manner
as in any trial. But, whatever may be the occasion for the new court
proceedings, we are back to the basic need for making economic advice
available to the courts.
SUMMARY
If economic analysis is to be applied widely in the field of competition
and monopoly, its methods must be operational. While there has been
some progress, these methods are not operational today.
In order to improve the utilization of economic analysis in antitrust,
lawyers and economists will have to develop a dearer understanding of
each other's methodology. The economist will have to acquire a more
precise grasp of the judicial system and of the operational framework of
the law. On the other hand, the lawyer will have to realize that the
economist will not learn to operate within the legal framework unless
he feels some pressure to do so because he is called upon for affirmative
assistance. The lawyer must reach out for help before he gets it. Just
as the economist has to improve his understanding of the legal frame-
work, the lawyer has to work with the economist on a more realistic basis
if he expects this progress.
The economist must recognize that in the administrative arena his
analytical tools will be used by lawyers who have not been brought up
on technical economic analysis. Lawyers are not skilled in the economic
jargon, nor do they have much patience with economic models. Fur-
ther, in their daily work they must operate within the bounds of the
current state of the law-the statutes, the judicial opinions, the legal
definitions of terms, and the judicial system.
The economist needs to differentiate more precisely between the
terms of its decree are carried out. . . .Thus the problem is thrown back upon the
enforcement agency which, save for the opportunity to invoke contempt, is exactly
where it was before the trial began. Actually, the [Antitrust] Division as at present
financed and staffed, is quite unable to undertake a task of such magnitude. .. .
HAMILTON & TILL, op. cit. supra note 79, at 77.
'3" In some instances, the Division has been given the right to ask for a modification
of the decree or for additional relief. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
i.o F. Supp. 295, 351 (D. Mass. 1953) 5 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
91 F. Supp. 333, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) ; United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries,
1o5 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
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use of his analysis in policy-making and in administration. In the broad
development of public policy, the economist does not operate within the
limitations of the current laws or of the judicial system. He has an
opportunity to consider economic issues on a wider base, recognizing the
present state of the law and the judicial system as data in his analysis.
However, he is not bound by them.
It is within the economist's province to challenge the statutes and
decisions as well as government policies and procedures which do not
focus on litigation. He can look into government action which dulls
the edge of competition as well as policies which sharpen it. He can
make recommendations about the use of nonjudicial government action
to inject competitive forces. For example, he can suggest the removal
of a protective tariff to increase competition or the use of government
purchases to induce other companies to enter into an industry.
It would be fruitless to assign fault to the lawyers or to the econo-
mists for the inadequate utilization of economic tools of analysis in the
field of competition and monopoly. The task is much greater than
either profession has recognized. Neither can expect the other to tackle
the task alone. The process must be developed co-operatively. In order
to promote such co-ordination, several activities would have to be under-
taken. The legal and the economic professions would have to make
organized efforts at co-operation. In this program, government agencies
could make a forward contribution. Since the government agencies are
the active instigators in antitrust litigation, they provide the setting for
most qases.'3 9 If they were to make wider use of economic analysis, they
could exert a profound influence on their application in litigation. At
the same time, their employment of economic analysis in deciding which
industrial sectors need attention and in reviewing the effects of past
decrees would give further impetus to the practical application of the
tools of economic analysis.
Another substantial contribution could be made by the universities.
Graduate students of economics can be given an appreciation of the
function of economic analysis within this legal framework, and law
students can be shown the uses and advantages of economic analysis. 140
Various research agencies, too, can contribute to a better understanding
and a testing of the methods of analysis in an effort to make them
operational.
"" See Grether, supra note 5; KAYSEN, op. dt. supra note 6, at 337-38.
140This, of course, is not a new suggestion. In 19o, H. W. Humble felt that per-
haps lawyers should be trained as economists and economists trained as lawyers. Humble,
Economics from a Legal Standpoint, 42 AM. L. REV. 379 (1908).
